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The Submarine and Sea Power

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French soldier. The author states in one passage that "as the destruction and terror intensify, so does the hatred of the [Vietnamese] villagers for the Americans, leaving the American soldier, who believed he came to help, caught in a quicksand of hatred and frustration." Thich Nhat Hanh contends that if the Vietnamese could speak freely regarding American involvement in Vietnam, they would disclose the falsity of the expressed American intent of saving the Vietnamese from communism. They want the Americans to be their ally for peace not for war. He further contends that the only possible way of really weakening Communist influence in Vietnam is to take away from the Communists their claim to be the only defenders of patriotism. He concludes that the present Vietnamese situation is, in reality, an ideological war between the United States and Communist China and that Vietnam is the victim of this struggle. His suggestion is that the United States must change her attitude toward the People's Republic of China.

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Hezlet, Sir Arthur. *The Submarine and Sea Power*. New York: Stein and Day, 1967. 278 p.

In a concise, explicit, and readable style, Sir Arthur Hezlet traces the complete evolution and history of submarines and their strategic employment. Specifically dealt with are the purposes for which submarines have been built, their employment policies and broad campaigns in time of war, and analyses of submarine problems, successes, failures, and future possibilities. In addition to outlining submarine evolution, the author postulates several conclusions, generally uncontroversial. Prior to 1914 the submarine mission had grown from base to coast defense, and thence to an offensive system to be used in enemy waters. The vast World War I Allied

patrol and barrier system that was implemented was ineffective. On the other hand, the convoy system was most useful in thwarting, although not defeating, the U-boats, which were never capable of stopping sufficient movement of men and materials to be decisive; however, submarines did prove themselves *potentially* decisive. In World War II the measure of the capability of submarines ranged from their unsuccessful employment by the Italians to the outstanding achievements of the Americans' submarines operating in the Pacific as commerce raiders. Continuing his thesis, the author notes that in the Atlantic it was the convoy system backed by excellent technological superiority which eventually defeated the German submarine campaign.

Submarines had again proved their potential as a decisive weapon of seapower. After aircraft from carriers or shore bases, submarines in World War II had a greater influence than any other arm of the Fleet. The most effective use of the submarine is as a weapon of attrition in enemy waters against merchant ships used to transport men or materials. As to the future, the Polaris submarine shows that the submarine has developed faster than have the ASW countermeasures, and, further, that the sonar of today is of less value against nuclear submarines than the early Asdic's were against the U-boats in 1939. There is nothing in the foreseeable future to challenge the Polaris submarine. Faced with a nuclear stalemate and a conventional war at sea, it is estimated that a force of 30 nuclear submarines could sink some 50 million tons of shipping per year, or more than three times the maximum rate at which free world vessels were being constructed at the height of the Second World War. In the future, therefore, the submarine is likely to be the dominating weapon of seapower.

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